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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CONTRACTS
By JOHN L. THORNDAL*
I. OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
Kinney v. Hardeman1 was a case of first impression in Colorado.
The plaintiff contended that the defendant was required to accept
his low bid for certain construction work. The defendant requested
bids on certain work but did neither specifically seek bids from
the plaintiff nor did he make any representations to the plaintiff
as to how he would determine the successful bidder. The defendant
was granted summary judgment which was affirmed on writ of
error.
[I] t is obvious that, at best, it was merely an invitation
to bid and not an operative offer. Plaintiff's bid itself
constituted the offer and it would take defendant's ac-
ceptance to complete a contract.
Mere notification or knowledge that one's bid is low
cannot of itself create a contract between the parties....
[A]n owner is under no obligation to accept any bid..
2
This is true even though the defendant did not reserve a right
to reject bids. The court recognized that express terms in the call
for bids might alter the rule.
No reference to any previous Colorado cases was made by the
court nor did the author find one directly in point. Colorado prece-
dent applicable to acceptance or rejection of bids can be found
only in cases which concern municipal corporations having ordi-
nances providing that all public improvement contracts shall be
let to the lowest bidder.3 A contract is not formed until it is ac-
cepted, and the municipality need not accept any bids.4
Williston,5 Corbin,6 and the majority of states are in accord with
the rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Colorado.
11. NOVATION
In Reilly v. Cook, McKay and Co.,7 the plaintiff was an assignee
of claims against the defendant Reilly. The claims were based on
professional services rendered for Reilly by the plaintiff's assignors
- two attorneys. The findings of the trial court resulted in a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the full sum requested, plus
interest. The supreme court affirmed.
The evidence was sufficient for the trial court to determine
that Reilly and his attorneys agreed to a fee of 3,000 dollars, of
which 2,750 dollars had been paid. There was also sufficient evi-
dence to support the conclusion that there was an agreement, which
was an integral part of the contract, for the payment of a bonus
* Junior Student, University of Denver College of Law.
1 379 P.2d 628 (Colo. 1963).
2 Id. at 631.
3 Colorado Central Power Co. v. Municipal Power Dev. Co., 1 F. Supp. 961 (1932); City of
Colorado Springs v. Coray, 25 Colo. App. 640, 139 Pac. 1031 (1914); City of Denver v. Dumars, 33
Colo. 94, 80 Pac. 114 (1904).
4 1 Williston, Contracts § 31 (1936).
5 Ibid.
6 1 Corbin, Contracts § 24 (1963).
7 381 P.2d 261 (Colo. 1963).
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of 2,500 dollars in the event Reilly was successful on appeal. The
appeal was successful, but Reilly failed to pay. Subsequently, a
friend of Reilly's, Floyd Rathbun, executed a document, the intent
of which was to guarantee the ultimate payment of the 2,500 dollars.
The defendants contended that the guarantee by Rathbun was
in fact a novation. The court held that the guarantee did not con-
stitute a novation in view of the lack of an agreement between
all parties for its substitution in place of the original agreement.
"'There can be no novation and substitution in law unless the
original debtor, the original creditor, and the new debtor have all
entered into such agreement.' " The holding of this case reaffirms
prior Colorado decisions 9 and follows the rule of the majority of
jurisdictions.10
III. INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACT
Hunt v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co." presents an interesting situation
raising a question of the law of contracts with regard to an interpre-
tation of a workmen's compensation insurance policy.
The plaintiff was injured in an industrial accident while
employed by Helmbold & Son, Inc. The policy was ordered by
Helmbold between 10 A.M. and 11 A.M. on June 20 and was issued
effective 12: 01 A.M., June 20. The accident in question occurred
about 9:45 A.M., June 20, but Helmbold did not inform the insurer
of this when he applied for the policy.
[P] arties may . .. enter contracts of insurance to pro-
tect against a loss that, unknown to the parties, has already
occurred, . . . the knowledge and concealment of such
loss by the insured operates as a bar to recovery under
the policy.
12
Ordinarily Hunt would be a third party beneficiary since the
policy was made by the employer for the benefit of the employee.
The facts of the case established that a contract of insurance was
never is existence, and, therefore, third party beneficiary doctrine
could not be applied.
The doctrines of promissory estoppel or equitable estoppel were
not applicable since the facts did not show that Hunt was misled
into believing there was insurance in force. If misled, it was by
his employer; and there would be no estoppel against the insurer.
12
IV. FRAUD, RESCISSION, AND LIABILITY OF AGENT FOR DAMAGES
In Meredith v. Ramsdell, 14 Meredith originally sued both Rams-
dell and All State Oil Corporation. His complaint against All State
called for rescission of two instruments which composed a contract.
The trial court found that All State had breached the contract and
that Meredith was entitled to a decree of rescission. Meredith's
complaint against Ramsdell alleged fraud in the sale to him of the
8 Id. at 264. (Emphasis was added by the court.)
9 Temple v. Teller Lumber Co., 46 Colo. 497, 106 Pac. 8 (1909); Richardson Drug Co. v. Dunagan,
8 Colo. App. 308, 46 Pac. 227 (1896); Woodruff v. Hensel, 5 Colo. App. 103, 37 Pac. 948 (1894);
Charles v. Amos, 10 Colo. 272, 15 Pac. 417 (1887).
106 Corbin, Contracts § 1297 (1962).
11 387 P.2d 405 (Colo. 1963).
12 Id. at 406.
13 Accord, Matlock v. Hollis, 153 Kan. 227, 109 P.2d 119 (1941); Century Indem. Co. v. Jameson,
333 Mass. 503, 131 N.E.2d 767 (1956).
14 384 P.2d 941 (Colo. 1963).
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two instruments while Ramsdell acted as president of All State.
Meredith sought 3,500 dollars from All State as restitution or as
damages against Ramsdell. The trial court held against Meredith
on his complaint against Ramsdell. This was the only matter on
writ of error.
The supreme court first found that the two instruments which
were executed simultaneously constituted a contract. "[A] n agree-
ment may be evidenced by several writings, which, when connect-
ed, show the parties, subject matter, terms, and consideration.' u5
Since there was but one contract, though comprised of two
instruments, fraud in one instrument would infect the entire trans-
action. The court found that fraud did exist because All State
never had an interest in the property sold in the second instru-
ment and never had the quantity of interest claimed in the first
instrument.
16
The primary question on appeal was whether Meredith could
have judgment for damages against Ramsdell as All State's agent
when, in the same action, he obtained a decree of rescission against
All State. The general rule is that there can be but one satisfaction
for an injury.17 Meredith's problem was that All State was out
of business and had no assets.
The relief granted against All State was equitable, and equity
does not do justice by halves."' The rules of equity are applied to
conditions as they existed at the close of the litigation. Thus a
court of equity could determine the liability of Ramsdell when it
became obvious that a decree of rescission against All State would
not be adequate.
There is no question regarding the plaintiff's right to rescind
the contract; the principal (All State) should not be allowed to
benefit from the fraud to which it was a party. 19 The weight of
authority supports the view that the rescinding party has a right
to recover damages in case of fraud. This is not inconsistent with
the doctrine of rescission.20 Meredith's problem, however, was one
of collecting damages from the agent because the principal was
unable to pay; to deny compensation would certainly be inequit-
able.21 The court held:
[A] defrauded party may proceed against the principal
and the agent, seeking rescission against the principal and
damages against the agent who procured the execution of
15 Id. at 944.
16 On establishing fraud, the court followed 0. K. Uranium Dev. Co. v. Miller, 140 Colo. 490,
345 P.2d 382 (1959). In this case Miller was induced by an officer of 0. K. Uranium and another to
purchase stock in the company. They represented to Miller that the company had sufficient funds
to operate for six months, that it was in good financial condition, and that the company had
valuable uranium property. Later Miller discovered that the company had no property, the only
interests were options held in the name of one of the corporate officers, and the only cash avail-
able was that which Miller had invested. The court at page 492 said, "that the evidence, . . . was
sufficient to justify a finding of false representation as an inducement to the plaintiff to purchase
the corporate stock in question and to support a judgment of rescission based thereon."
17 Spaulding Mfg. Co. v. Board of Com'rs, 63 Colo. 438, 168 Pac. 34 (1917); German Nat'l Bank
v. J. D. Best & Co., 32 Colo. 192, 75 Pac. 398 (1904). The doctrine of election of remedies applies
only in those cases where the remedies sought are inconsistent with each other.
18 Doherty & Co. v. Steele, 71 Colo. 33, 204 Pac. 77 (1922).
19 Restatement (Second), Agency § 259 (1958). "A transaction into which one is induced to enter
by reliance upon untrue and material representations as to subject matter, made by [on] agent
entrusted with its preliminary or final negotiations, is subject to rescission at the election of the
person deceived."
2024 Am. Jur. Fraud & Deceit § 211 (1939).
21 Restatement (Second), Agency § 348 (1958). "An agent who fraudulently makes representa-
tions. . . . or knowingly assists in the commission of tortious fraud . . . by his principal . . . is
subject to liability in tort to the injured person although the fraud . . . occurs in a transaction on
behalf of the principal."
1964
DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL
the contract. Such defrauded party can have one satisfac-
tion, and failing to obtain restitution either wholly or
partly from the principal, may recover from the agent such
sum as will constitute restoration to status quo.
22
This decision follows a body of law which holds that the plain-
tiff's rescission as a result of fraud does not destroy his right to
recover damages from a third party as long as he has failed to obtain
satisfaction for his injury, either by restoration or recovery of the
consideration.
2 3
It appears that this result follows where both causes of action
are united in the same complaint. Separate actions cannot be main-
tained at the same time since the plaintiff would have no claim
against the agent if successful against the principal; he would
receive all that he had paid. The plaintiff would have a claim
against the agent only if he failed to obtain full satisfaction from
the principal.
24
The interesting aspect of this case is that the court is looking
beyond the corporation to its president and holding him personally
liable for fraud when the corporation is unable to pay. It will be
interesting to see how this case will affect future corporate con-
tractual relations.
V. COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT
Cummings2 5 sought specific performance or damages against
Walter and Edna Goltl alleging that the Goltls breached their obli-
gation to sell real estate regarding which the plaintiff had an exclu-
sive option to purchase. During the trial the parties advised the
court that both parties had conferred upon this matter and they
then read into the record a stipulation for settlement of the case.
The trial was halted and the parties given 30 days to perform their
obligations under the agreement.
Within 30 days Cummings advised the court that the defendants
had refused to abide by the stipulation. The court entered judgment
in conformity with the terms of the stipulation, thereby com-
pelling the Goltls to abide by their agreement. The Goltls contended
the court should proceed with the trial of the matter because the
stipulation was not enforceable, that the trial was merely postponed
and would be resumed if an agreement could not be reached.
The supreme court affirmed the judgment, quoting from Han-
sen v. Ryan26 which presented an analogous situation:
Where the parties have voluntarily entered into a
stipulation, which appears fair and reasonable for the
compromise and settlement of the issues of a pending cause,
and where the stipulation is spread upon the record with
the consent and approval of the court, . . . the parties are
bound thereby and the court may, thereafter, properly
22 384 P.2d at 946.
23 The court found sufficient authority for its reasoning, but it relied primarily on J. C. Turner
Lumber Co. v. Lacey, 201 App. Div. 41, 193 N.Y.S. 656 (1922). The Supreme Court of Colorado said,
however, that no action at low could be maintained for damages until the fact that the plaintiff
had suffered damage had been determined in an equity suit.
24 3 C.J.S. Agency §§ 221(b), 288, 303(b)(2) (1936).
25 Goltl v. Cummings. 380 P.2d 556 (Colo. 1963).
26 186 S.W.2d (Mo. 1945).
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proceed to dispose of the case on the basis of the pleadings,
the stipulations and admitted facts.
2 7
Defendants argued that the trial court's statement "if the terms
and conditions of the stipulation are not complied with we may
resume the trial of the case at the point where we left off" meant
that the original trial would be resumed if the defendants refused
to comply with the agreement. But the court felt that when the
statement was viewed in context it merely indicated that the trial
could continue if the terms of the stipulation could not be met,
even though all parties attempted to do so. The facts of the case
indicate that there was an agreement and that only the defendants
had changed their minds.
The court made reference to Karpinski v Karpinski28 regarding
the duty of the court. "It would make for mockery in the adminis-
tration of justice in this court and breed contempt for its power
if a party were permitted to evade responsibility assumed before
the bench after days in litigation and trial.
'29
On petition for rehearing by defendants, the court remanded
to the trial court with directions to modify its order and judgment
so as to conform to all the terms of the stipulation, some of which
had been omitted from the trial court decree.
Colorado has no previous cases in point, but there are cases
within the general field of compromise and settlement.30 A compro-
mise is an agreement settling an existing claim in dispute or doubt
by substituted performance and can be classified under the head-
ing of accord and satisfaction since a compromise is always an
accord. 81
VI. BROKER'S COMMISSION CLAIM
The plaintiff in Cary v. Borden Co. 32 alleged that he rendered
services in searching for a dairy which the defendant could pur-
chase and thereby became entitled to a 5% commission which was
to be added to the gross selling price. His second claim was for
recovery of the reasonable value of his services as a finder or
business broker. Both claims were against the purchaser, the
Borden Company, and the seller, Carlson-Frink Company. The
defendant purchased the dairy, and the plaintiff claimed that
the transaction which he promoted, i.e., finding a dairy in Denver
for Borden, was thereby consummated. The defendants filed mo-
tions to dismiss. The trial court dismissed the claim since it involved
real estate, and Cary did not have a real estate broker's license
as required by statute.33
The supreme court held the complaint stated claims which
were sufficient as against a motion to dismiss and reversed the
ruling of the trial court. In so holding, the court adopted the New
27 380 P.2d at 559.
28 130 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1954).
29 380 P.2d at 560.
30 West v. Wageforth, 79 Colo. 444, 246 Pac. 204 (1926); Hamill v. Copeland, 26 Colo. 178, 56
Pac. 901 (1899); Russell v. Daniels, 5 Colo. App. 224, 37 Pac. 726 (1894); Leichsenring v. Allen, 12
Colo. 168, 20 Pac. 332 (1888).
31 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1278 (1962).
32 386 P.2d 585 (Colo. 1963).
33 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 117-1-1 (1953). "It shall be unlawful for any person. . . . to engage in
the business or capacity of real estate broker or real estate salesman in this state without first
having obtained a license .... .
1964
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York rule3 4 which permits one who without a real estate broker's
license aids in the transfer of a going business to recover a com-
mission even though real estate forms an incident of the transaction.
[T] he fact that realty, if separately considered, would
fall within the descriptive words of the statute, cannot
justify the isolation of it for the purpose of treating it as
the subject of a separate sale; the realty must be regarded
as constituting an essential part of an exceptional and
unitary subject-matter of sale- the sale of a going concern
in which the realty involved was "not a dominant fea-
ture."35
The New Jersey rule,3 6 discussed and rejected by the court,
treats a contract in its entirety; if one part is void, the entire con-
tract is void. In Carter v. Thompkins37 the court approved the
theory that the legal activity is severable from the illegal. The
present court went a step further and expressly applied the New
York rule.
VII. CONTRACT FOR SALE OF LAND
Hokr 38 sought 5,000 dollars liquidated damages from de-
fendants for failure to complete a sale of real estate.39 In the same
suit Marlatt, a real estate broker, claimed a commission for procur-
ing a purchaser (Hokr) who was ready, able, and willing to buy
the real estate which as of record was owned by the three de-
fendants. According to the defendants Thomas and Anita Price,
they had by an unrecorded deed acquired the interests other than
the mineral interest and the interest in the producing oil well
of the third defendant Mary Price. They alleged that Marlatt had
breached his agreement with them when he acquired the signature
of Mary Price through fraud and trickery. The alleged reason for
this agreement between Thomas and Anita Price and Marlatt for
not having Mary Price affix her signature to the deed was so
that she could retain her mineral interests which they thought
she should keep. It was further alleged by the defendants that
their signatures were also obtained by fraud and false representa-
tions.
The lower court held that Marlatt had breached his fiduciary
relationship with the defendants and also that Hokr had no re-
course against the defendants.
The supreme court reversed on both points holding that there
had been no breach of fiduciary duty on the part of Marlatt
and that Hokr did have a perfectly valid contract and was entitled
to judgment for the amount agreed to as liquidated damages.
The court, without citing any case or secondary source in
point, held that the evidence supported a finding of fact that
Marlatt had not breached his fiduciary duty in securing the signa-
tures of the three defendants. Based on the fact that all three
defendants willingly and without any fraudulent inducement signed
34Weingast v. Rialto Pastry Shop, 243 N.Y. 113, 152 N.E. 693 (1926).
35 386 P.2d at 587.
36 Kenney v. Paterson Milk & Cream Co., 110 N.J.L. 141, 164 AtI. 274 (1933).
37 133 Colo. 279, 294 P.2d 265 (1956).
38 Hokr v. Price, 385 P.2d 664 (Colo. 1963).
39 The contract for the sale of the real estate between Holar and the defendants reserved one-
half of all the mineral interests in the sellers.
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the contract for the sale of the real estate, there was a valid con-
tract on which Hokr could recover damages for a breach thereof.
The court further stated that if Thomas and Anita Price sin-
cerely desired that May Price have the remaining one-half interest
of the mineral rights, they could convey to her their part of the
interest reserved by them in the contract of sale.
VIII. IMPLIED WARRANTY AS APPLIED TO REAL ESTATE CONTRACTS
Plaintiffs purchased from defendant Glisan 40 a home which was
still under construction at the closing date of the transaction. The
deed provided "house to be completed in workmanlike manner."
Shortly after the plaintiffs took possession and moved into the
house in question, cracks started appearing in surfaces of the house.
Within a short period of time the cracks had enlarged and the
doors and windows had tilted. Plaintiffs brought an action for
damages alleging (1) breach of implied warranty of fitness for
habitation, (2) tortious failures of Glisan, and (3) fraudulent con-
cealment. The trial court awarded the plaintiff the actual damages
and 750 dollars exemplary damages.
The supreme court reversed the judgment allowing exemplary
damages and remanded with directions to the trial court to vacate
that part of the judgment. Exemplary damages were not allowed
because the record showed the defendant was not guilty of
fraudulent concealment of the soil conditions which caused the
damage; the condition was known to both buyer and seller. The
plaintiff testified that before the agreement was effectuated he
discussed the soil condition with Glisan.
The court then applied the rule:
[T1here is an implied warranty where the contract
relates to a house which is still in the process of construc-
tion, where the vendor's workmen are still on the job, and
particularly where completion is not accomplished until the
house has arrived at the contemplated condition-namely,
finished and fit for habitation. 4
1
There are no prior Colorado cases on this point, but the court
found sufficient support from other jurisdictions.
42
Damages for breach of warranty are usually the difference
between actual value and the value as warranted. The court felt
the better rule in this case would be to allow the buyer the amount
he reasonably expended to bring the property into conformity with
the warranty.
The case came up for rehearing on December 16, 1963, 43 and
rehearing was denied. The holding was slightly modified, however.
A phrase which stated "the vendor of a completed house does not,
in the absence of some express bargain, undertake any obligation
with regard to the condition of such house," was deleted (emphasis
40 Glisan v. Smolenske, 385 P.2d 659 (Colo. 1963). The case appeared in the Pacific Reporter
Second advance sheets but before the bound volume of 385 Pacific Reporter Second Series was
released the case was withdrawn by Order of the Court. A somewhat modified version of the same
case appears in 387 P.2d 260 (1963).
41 385 P.2d at 663.
42 17a C.J.S. Contracts § 329 (1963). "[A]nd in building ... contracts . . . it is implied that
the building shall be erected and the work shall be done in a reasonably good and workmanlike
manner and when completed the structure shall be reasonably fit for the intended purpose."
43 Glisan v. Smolenske, 387 P.2d 260 (Colo. 1963).
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added). Other than this deletion, and a few minor changes due to
the deletion the case was printed exactly as on its first appeal.
Evidently the reason for this deletion was to allow for exten-
tion of the rule. This was accomplished on January 20, 1964, in
Carpenter v. Donohoe44 in another opinion written by Justice
Frantz. The court in Carpenter felt that the same rule should apply
to the purchaser of a completed house as to the purchaser of a
house which is nearing completion. Thus the implied warranty
doctrine that the house was built in workmanlike manner and is
suitable for habitation was extended to include agreements for
newly constructed buildings completed at the time of contracting.
The court did not cite any case as support for this extension
of the rule. Evidently only one judge has ever attempted to extend
the implied warranty doctrine this far; he failed for a majority
of the court in the case adopted the rule of caveat emptor.4 5 The
only authority the Colorado court could find was one law review
article 46 which is quite thorough in its treatment of real estate
warranties, both expressed and implied. This article does not lend
much support to extension of the doctrine and admits that even
the Miller case47 is based on doubtful rationale. The article suggests
that the only way to develop a solution fair to both parties will be
through the legislature. The author's proposed legislation is not
so broad as the rule applied by the Supreme Court of Colorado; he
would apply the implied warranty to completed buildings only
where the vendor had actual knowledge of the defects at the time
it was sold. Thus the Colorado court has extended a questionable
doctrine with only the apparent support of a law review article-
and that article is not really in point.
44 388 P.2d 399 (Colo. 1964).
45 Levy v. Young Constr. Co., 46 N.J. Super. 293, 134 A.2d 717 (1957).
46 14 Vand. L. Rev. 541 (1960).
47 Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., 2 K.B. 113 (1930). This case seems to be the leading case
in an expanding area of the law. An analysis of the case, however, reveals that it was decided on
an express warranty and the discussion of implied warranty was merely dictum.
COMPLIMENTS
OF
SYMES BUILDING
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